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
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
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Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance) Treaty with the Soviet Union,

Norway and Denmark belong to NATO, and Sweden is a neutral country.

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USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

SWEDISH SECURITY POLICY

INDIVIDUAL ESSAY

by

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1 May 1986

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ABSTRACT

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
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Sweden is a neutral country. The guiding principle of its policy is "nonparticipation in alliances in peacetime, aiming at neutrality in the event of war." Partially because of this policy Sweden has not been involved in war for more than 170 years. The question is now if it is possible for Sweden to remain neutral even in the future. The strategic importance of the Nordic Area has increased during the last 20 years. The vicinity of the military base in the Kola Peninsula is one example of that. Therefore, the risk for Sweden to be involved in a conflict between the two superpowers in the Nordic Area has increased. Sweden could be forced to give up its neutral policy in the future by economical or military reasons. Sweden has decreased its military defence during the last 25 years. Therefore, decisions concerning military defence in 1987 will be very important. A further decrease of military resources will imply that the military defence cannot support the security policy in a proper manner. However, the judgment is that the Parliament will increase the military spending. If this proves correct, there is no reason to change Swedish security policy during the rest of this century.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
ABSTRACT	ii
PURPOSE.	1
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND.	1
SOME BASIC FACTS ABOUT SWEDEN'S SECURITY POLICY.	3
THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE NORTH EUROPEAN AREA.	6
THREATS AGAINST SWEDEN	9
THE SECURITY POLICY.	12
THE FOREIGN POLICY	13
THE DEFENCE POLICY	15
SUMMARY.	18

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SWEDISH SECURITY POLICY

Purpose.

The purpose of this essay is to describe and analyze Swedish security policy, how it has worked in the past, how it works today, and what it might look like in the future.

Historical Background.

In 1968 the Swedish Parliament adopted the following goals for Swedish security policy:

Sweden's security policy, like that of other countries, aims to preserve the country's independence. The goal of our security policy should therefore be, in all situations and by the means of our own choice, to ensure national freedom of action in order that within our own borders we may preserve and develop our society in political, economic, social, cultural and all other respects, according to our own values, and in conjunction with this to promote international detente and peaceful development.¹

This declaration is still valid. Even if Sweden had not articulated the goals for our security policy so well before 1968, it had tried to apply them before that time. Sweden's foreign and defence policies based on neutrality have grown gradually since the beginning of the 19th century. Since 1814 Sweden has not been involved in any war. Therefore, Sweden may say that its security policy has been successful. But there have been situations during the 20th century when Sweden has not followed a strict neutral policy. Let me point out two examples:

(1) When World War I started in August 1914, the Swedish Foreign Minister indicated to Great Britain, Germany, and Russia that it would be difficult for Sweden because of anti-Russian sentiments in Sweden to keep out of the conflict. Based on that statement Russia prepared a naval attack against Swedish naval units at Gotland, because Russia

feared that the Swedish Navy would join the Germany Navy. At the last moment Russia cancelled the whole operation, because they were uncertain whether the Swedish Navy really would join the Germany Navy.² The lesson of this incident is that Swedish policy must be unambiguous, and firmly and consistently pursued. It is dangerous to leave room for doubt of our policy. The Swedish government has to avoid raising vain hopes in one country and causing groundless fears in another.

(2) In 1941 Germany forced the Swedish government to allow the transport of a German division from Norway to Finland through Sweden.³ The Swedish government considered that it was unable to prevent Germany from doing this because Swedish defences were too weak. This now appears to have been the right decision because it helped Sweden keep out of the war. At the same time it is important to think about the long-term consequences. A superpower may in the future cite this event to prove that Sweden does not conduct a genuine neutral policy. Also, Sweden supplied Germany with iron ore and other materials during World War II. Even that precedent can be used against Sweden in the future. In a study ("Soviet Amphibious Warfare and War on the Northern Flank") in December 1984 by the Soviet Research Center at Sandhurst, the authors say:

Of course Sweden is neutral, but the Soviet view of neutrality is not that of the west, and it is fair to say that, in a war, the Russians would not respect it unless it suited them to do so. In war, indeed, the Russians would not respect anyone's neutrality; while Sweden's neutrality is compromised, in the eyes of the Soviet Union, by its continuing to supply the Nazis with iron ore and other materials during the course of the Second World War. This, say the Russians, proves that Swedish neutrality is not genuine neutrality.⁴

This conclusion shows how important it is to conduct a consistent neutral policy while at the same time to realize that even such a policy is not an absolute guarantee that Sweden will avoid war. Therefore, Sweden must

base its security policy on a strong defence. During 172 years of peace Sweden has considered giving up its neutral policy only once. In 1948, after World War II, Sweden invited Norway and Denmark to join her in a military alliance.⁵ Sweden was unwilling to be a member of NATO, but at the same time Sweden was not sure if its neutral policy would work in the future. The purpose of the proposed alliance was that all three countries would mutually assist each other if one or two of them were attacked. The alliance was to have pursued a policy of neutrality against the rest of the world. Norway and Denmark rejected the proposal, finding NATO a better alternative.

Some Basic Facts About Sweden's Security Policy.

Sweden's security policy rests on two pillars: the foreign policy and the defence policy. The guiding principle of Sweden's foreign policy is "nonparticipation in alliances in peacetime, aiming at neutrality in the event of war." This means that Sweden is not a member of any political or military alliance. In the event of war Sweden will declare itself neutral. All attempts to violate Swedish frontiers no matter from where they come will be repelled. There is broad consensus in Sweden that neutrality is the best way to preserve the country's independence and to safeguard its democratic system of government. This policy is supported by all political parties in the Parliament.

In Europe there are three neutral countries--Sweden, Switzerland, and Austria. It is interesting to note that their policies are not exactly the same.⁶ Sweden's neutrality is neither laid down in the constitution nor guaranteed by any international agreement. Switzerland, on the other hand, has gained international recognition for its neutrality

through the Vienna Congress and the Versailles Peace Treaty. Something similar applies to Austrian neutrality. The Austrian neutrality is also a self-chosen policy. It has been affirmed by the Austrian State Treaty in a way that gives the superpowers reason to expect Austria to continue pursuing a policy of neutrality. Sweden has rejected the idea of any international agreement, because we are afraid that guarantees furnished by superpowers would create some measure of Swedish dependence on these states.

In peacetime there are no rules of international laws on how a neutral state must behave. However, one requirement is fundamental-- a neutral country must not be a member of any alliance. In wartime a neutral country has to consider the Hague Conventions of 1907 and 1912.⁷ A neutral country has, for example, the obligation to refuse the transit of troops and the duty to intern belligerent troops entering the neutral country. This means that a neutral country at least must have a sufficiently strong defence to fulfill these requirements.

The official policy of neutrality does not imply that Sweden has to be neutral in the views it expresses. In fact, the right and necessity to take a stand on international issues are strongly underlined. The fact that Sweden does not belong to alliances makes it easier for her to take an independent view of events in the world. Sweden has, for example, protested very strongly both against the United States' involvement in the Vietnam War and against the Soviet Union's war in Afghanistan. Sweden's policy may also afford greater opportunities for making constructive contributions to the promotion of peace and justice.

As pointed out earlier, the guiding principle of Swedish foreign policy is "nonparticipation in alliances in peacetime, aiming at neutrality in the event of war." Does this mean that Sweden should not be a member of any organization? That depends on the aim of the organization. For example, Sweden is a member of the United Nations, which has collective security and peaceful cooperation as its program.⁸ Sweden supports such a program. However, Sweden could be involved in sanctions against another country based on decisions made in the Security Council, but there is no risk that Sweden can be ordered to declare war against one of the superpowers, because the Security Council has to be united in such a decision and that is impossible. Sweden is not a member of the European Communities (EC).⁹ There are two reasons why we could not join the EC in 1971. The first reason concerns political cooperation. Sweden could have been drawn into cooperation in the formulation of a common EC foreign policy. This is unacceptable for a neutral country. Second, an economic union, like EC, could have deprived Sweden of some of its national sovereignty. So Sweden could not be a member of the EC. However, Sweden did negotiate an agreement on free trade with the EC.

Foreign policy is one part of the security policy; defence policy is the other part. I will discuss later in this essay how strong the Swedish defence should be. Now I will only point out some important principles. First of all, it must be strong enough to make resistance worthwhile. However, the defence has one limitation. It provides no real protection against a comprehensive nuclear attack, even though Sweden has a good air defence and civil defence. Secondly, the structure of the defence must be such that it can be used in all directions.

Thirdly, the defence must be organized and equipped in such a manner that it is self-supporting, without help from abroad, at least for an initial period. This requires a domestic military industry.

The Security Environment in the North European Area.

Europe has lived in peace for 45 years now, the longest period in its history. The most important reason for this is mutual nuclear deterrence. The situation in Central Europe has come to a deadlock on the high level of armaments. Should it come to a conflict, the consequences may be disastrous. The situation in Northern Europe is somewhat different, compared with the situation in Central Europe. The political situation in Northern Europe and the security policies which the Nordic countries pursue are stable. However, the North European and North Atlantic area is the subject of increasing interest on the part of the superpowers. In the North European area, where there is no well-defined front, the two superpowers have some liberty in actions and maneuvers which they lack in Central Europe.

The strategic importance of the North European and North Atlantic area depends, first of all, on the Soviet Union's increasing naval strategic interests in the area. The Soviet navy has been developed from a coastal fleet to an essential component in the Soviet strategic nuclear forces. The Soviet Union has built up a huge military base for its Northern Fleet in the Kola Peninsula, where the Soviet naval forces have ice-free harbors the year-round, although the base is relatively narrow and vulnerable. The Northern Fleet possesses 64% of the most modern Soviet SSBNs (the Typhoon, Delta I-III, and Yankee classes), 75% of its most modern attack submarines, 95 maritime attack aircraft (Badgers and Blinders), and 66% of the latest combat ships.

This makes a total of 122 ships. These forces probably have the mission of protecting the SSBN fleet in the Barents Sea and Atlantic Ocean, preventing a NATO naval deployment forward of the G-I-UK Gap and interdicting the Atlantic SLOC to Europe. The Kola Peninsula is also part of the Arkhangelsk air defence district with more than 120 interceptors, 16 airfields, and 30 surface-to-air missile sites (approximately 200 launchers). The Soviet ground forces in the northwestern TVD is limited, compared with the naval and air forces. Two motorized rifle divisions (the 45th and 341st MRD) are located in the Kola Peninsula together with a naval infantry brigade (63rd NIB). However, seven divisions plus an airborne division (76th Guard Airborne Division) in the Leningrad Military District would be capable of rapid deployment to the Kola Peninsula in the event of hostilities.¹⁰

Compared with the Soviet Union, NATO has fewer forces at its disposal, particularly with respect to ground forces. Norway has one brigade in the northern part of the country and can mobilize a total of approximately 250,000 men. A U.S. Marine Amphibious Brigade has been designated for reinforcement of Norway since 1977. The U.S. and Norway agreed in 1981 to the prepositioning of equipment in Trondelag for this brigade. NATO's naval presence in the north is generally limited to periodic deployments of the Standing Naval Force Atlantic. NATO can fly in aircraft at a rate so as to achieve equality with the Warsaw Pact in a short time. Access to Norwegian air bases would be of great importance in such a situation.¹¹ A crucial question is how NATO intends to use its naval forces in the event of war. Secretary of the Navy John Lehman said in 1984:

Our answer to the Soviet submarine threat to our Atlantic lifelines could not be simply to throw

a passive anti-submarine barrier across the G-I-UK Gap. The qualitative and quantitative transformation to the Soviet fleet required a wholesale revision of American naval strategy. Such a strategy had to recognize that the United States had no margin of safety in merchant marine or sealift assets. The Soviets had built up a submarine force and forward deployed it to take advantage of this U.S. weakness. The answer and corresponding strategy thus became clear: We should build up the fleet to regain the vital supremacy of the seas, develop a forward strategy that would dominate the northern and southern flanks of NATO and, in doing so, throw the Soviets on the defensive.¹²

Apparently NATO is prepared to attack the Soviet Northern Fleet close to its base in the Kola Peninsula. This means an increased risk that such a war will then spread to the whole Nordic area.

The strategic importance of the southern part of the North European area should be seen in the context of a struggle for supremacy in the North Atlantic area and of a possible need to use Nordic territory to support operations in Central Europe. The Baltic Sea is also important for the Soviet Union as a maintenance area for the Soviet navy. The Soviet shipyard capacity located in the Baltic Sea is at present being expanded which indicates that the Baltic area is of great importance to the Soviet Union. Therefore, the Baltic Sea must be considered a vital area for the Soviet Union's Northern Fleet. In the event of war the Warsaw Pact may find it necessary to open the Baltic Straits for the purpose of exploiting its Baltic bases and naval resources. Control of Denmark and the southern part of Norway is then necessary and control of the southern part of Sweden is an advantage.

When one looks upon Sweden's security environment, it is important to note that a security balance and stability exists in the Nordic area in spite of (or thanks to?) the Nordic countries' different alternatives in solving their security problems. Finland has its FCMA (Friendship,

Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance) Treaty with the Soviet Union, Norway and Denmark belong to NATO, and Sweden is a neutral country. One country cannot change its security policy without it having a great impact on the other countries. When Finland concluded the FCMA Treaty with the Soviet Union in 1948, it was Finland's only possibility for remaining free and independent. The most important part of the security policy is its foreign policy, but it is interesting to note that Finland intends to increase its defence by about 3.8% annually during the next five years. Denmark and Norway became members of NATO because of their experiences in World War II. They considered that only as members of a large alliance could they achieve sufficient military capacity to deter aggression and to defend themselves in the event of a conflict. It is important to note that both Denmark and Norway have restrictions in their military cooperation with NATO. They do not accept allied troops being permanently based in their countries and do not permit nuclear weapons to be stationed in their territories during peacetime. While Norway intends to increase its defence by about 3.5% annually during the next five years, Denmark is expected to continue its defence on the same level as today.¹³

Threats Against Sweden.

The threats against Sweden may involve political pressure, economic aggression, war in the world around Sweden, and/or a military attack. I will now concentrate on the military threat against Sweden, but also very briefly comment on the other threats. Sweden, as other countries, is exposed to political pressure every day. However, it is worthwhile to note that political pressure is almost always used together with other threats. The best defence against political pressure is a stable

democratic society, a firm foreign policy based on a good economic defence, and a strong military and civil defence.

The economic threat against Sweden will increase in the future, because our economic dependence on the rest of the world is constantly growing. Sweden is especially dependent on the import of petroleum products and high technology. Although Sweden has succeeded in decreasing its dependence on petroleum products during the last ten years and no longer imports so much from the Middle East, a lack of energy resources is still a great problem. A special problem for Sweden has been the U.S. embargo of high technology to the Soviet Union and other eastern countries.

What is the military threat against Sweden? As a neutral state, Sweden has to defend itself against an attack wherever it may come from. The likelihood of an attack from the Warsaw Pact is greater than from NATO for the following reasons:

- Ideological -- Because Sweden belongs to the western society.
- Geographical -- NATO "owns" the most important areas in the northern part of Europe (the northern part of Norway and the Baltic Straits) and has no interest to change this situation.
- Military Strength -- NATO has no military capacity to attack the Warsaw Pact in the northern part of Europe.

The only plausible reason for NATO to attack Sweden may be to prevent the Warsaw Pact from attacking the country. One might compare this to the situation during World War II when the allies were prepared to attack Norway and the northern part of Sweden to prevent Germany from launching an attack against these two countries. However, Germany succeeded in launching its attack first.

A neutral Sweden is certainly not a primary target in a superpower conflict. Geographical facts, however, indicate that Sweden might be drawn into such a conflict. Swedish territory might be touched by combat in the arctic areas of Scandinavia or around the Baltic Straits.¹⁴ In the northern part of Scandinavia the goal of the Warsaw Pact is to take control of the fjords in the northern part of Norway, so that distances to its objectives in the Atlantic would be shorter. The Warsaw Pact has two options to launch an attack against the northern part of Norway. It could attack only Norway or it could also launch an attack through Finland and Sweden. An attack confined to Norway would be a very complicated operation because there is only one approach to use. On the other hand, if the Warsaw Pact launches an attack through Finland and Sweden, it would be forced to divide a lot of units against these two countries. The defence of the northern part of Sweden is difficult because so few people live there. Units have to mobilize in the middle part of the country and then move to the northern part of Sweden.

The Warsaw Pact would also seek to seize the Baltic Straits, in order to use the Baltic Fleet in the Atlantic and also to use its maintenance capacity in the Baltic Sea. To do this the Warsaw Pact has first to control Denmark, but must also control the southern part of Norway. Although the Warsaw Pact need not control the southern part of Sweden, it would be an advantage to them. After taking control of Denmark, the Warsaw Pact can launch an attack against the southern part of Norway:

- from Denmark. It is a very risky operation because NATO can launch an attack from the Atlantic.

- from Denmark or East Germany/Poland through the southern part of Sweden.

- and perhaps from the Soviet Union through the middle part of Sweden.

In summary, the greatest military threat against Sweden comes from the Warsaw Pact. The risk for an attack is greatest against the northern and southern parts of Sweden.

The Security Policy.

In the next three chapters I will try to analyze how Sweden's security policy and its two parts--foreign policy and defence policy--may be changed in the future.

Which are the greatest threats against Sweden's security policy generally? Can these threats force Sweden to abandon its neutral policy and join an alliance? My answer is "yes." Let me point out three reasons why Sweden can be forced to change its policy of neutrality.¹⁵

The first reason is economical. Sweden's economical dependence on the rest of the world is constantly growing. The difficulties of securing necessary supplies in the event of war or blockade will increase. As in the negotiations with the European Communities, Sweden can be forced to choose between economic benefits or to pursue its neutral policy. The question remains whether Sweden is prepared to continue its policy, even if this policy harms Sweden's economy. Probably not.

The second reason concerns the level of forces in Europe. These might change. For example, Warsaw Pact forces may increase to such a degree that Sweden would be forced to join NATO. On the other hand, the strength of the two military alliances in Europe might decrease.

Some countries like Norway and Denmark might choose to leave their alliances and become neutral, or perhaps form new alliances in the Nordic area. Sweden perhaps can be a member in such an alliance.

The third reason is purely military. Keeping defence forces at top-level technological standard demands not only an unfailing willingness of the Swedish people to make sacrifices but probably also intensified international cooperation for military research and development. Is it possible for a neutral country in the future to have close cooperation with a military alliance concerning military research and development? This is doubtful and is another reason why Sweden might be forced to change its security policy in the future.

The Foreign Policy.

An overriding motive underlying Sweden's foreign policy now and in the future is to avoid war. There always is a risk in this nuclear age that a conventional war might escalate into a nuclear war to threaten the very existence of mankind. Therefore, Sweden tries to remain committed to international efforts for detente and disarmament so the arms race can be halted and a military balance between the two superpowers can be established at a lower level than at present. Sweden's efforts are aimed at accomplishing international disarmament in accordance with a formula that does not allow either side an advantage, but that does lead to increased security for all nations. The goal is to replace the kind of security that is dependent on increasing armaments by a concept of common security, which is basically political and rests upon mutual confidence.¹⁶

Sweden's position as a nonaligned country gives us great opportunities to play an active and constructive role working for detente

and disarmament. Sweden also has great professional expertise at its disposal concerning many of these issues. Disarmament has, therefore, become an important area in which we pursue an active foreign policy. We do this especially in the UN, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Sweden worked for many years to create the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Now we have these agreements, but Sweden seeks to improve them even more. In the UN Sweden is also working for a nuclear freeze.

Of course, Sweden is especially interested in reducing the nuclear threat in the Nordic area and in Europe as a whole. Therefore Sweden supports the creation of a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Nordic area. Sweden has stated that nuclear weapons which are intended for targets in this area should be withdrawn from the vicinity. The zone must also include the Baltic Sea. Such an agreement could have a great impact on both the Nordic countries and the two superpowers and would take a long time to reach, if it is possible at all.

Sweden also supports the proposal for a corridor free from battlefield nuclear weapons in Central Europe. Such a corridor could help to raise the nuclear threshold in Europe and reduce military tension. Confidence-building measures intended to reduce military tension are an important element to promote the policy of detente, on which the participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) agreed in 1975. In view of the fact that we are acting as hosts, it is natural for us to devote special attention to the Stockholm Conference on Security and Confidence-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe that is now in progress.

The Defence Policy.

Of course, an active and constructive foreign policy is not enough to preserve peace. Without a strong defence Sweden, as other countries, cannot defend its national interests, especially in critical situations. In such situations the superpowers only respect strength. Since World War II Sweden has built up a strong total defence. This defence consists of military defence, civil defence, economic defence, and psychological defence. I will stress here military defence, because in a "worse-case-scenario" this is the most important part of the total defence. However, I assume that Sweden will develop the other parts of the total defence in such a manner that we will have a well-balanced total defence, even in the future.

As I pointed out earlier, Sweden built up a strong defence after World War II. In the beginning of the 1960's Sweden used about 4.5% of its GNP and almost 20% of the national budget for the military defence.¹⁷ We had a strong wartime organization, for example:

- Infantry Brigades	20
- Infantry Brigades for the Northern Part of Sweden	4
- Armored Brigades	6
- Submarines	24
- Frigates	57
- Coast Artillery Battalions	40
- Aircraft Squadrons (Fighters).	22
- Aircraft Squadrons (Attack).	12
- Aircraft Squadrons (Recon)	10

Since the beginning of the 1960's Sweden has used less and less money on its defence. Now it is using only 2.7% of the GNP or about 7.5% of the national budget for military purposes. The impact of the wartime organization has been comprehensive.¹⁸ Sweden has now a wartime organization of:

- Infantry Brigades 10 (plus 8 with older equipment)
- Infantry Brigades for the Northern Part of Sweden 5
- Armored Brigades 4 (plus 1 mechanized brigade)
- Submarines 12
- Frigates 34
- Coast Artillery Battalions 29
- Aircraft Squadrons (Fighters). 11
- Aircraft Squadrons (Attack). 5.5
- Aircraft Squadrons (Recon) 4

During the last 15 years Sweden has decreased its defence efforts in real terms, while the Warsaw Pact has increased its defence efforts by two to four percent every year. During the 1980's most of the countries in NATO also have increased their defence efforts. The decreasing trend has to be broken in Sweden, otherwise the Swedish defence will not have the capability to support its security policy in a proper way. What are the plans for the future? In 1987 the Swedish Parliament will decide about the development of the defence between 1987 and 1997. The government has ordered the Supreme Commander to study the defence in the future on four different economic levels¹⁹ (Million U.S. Dollars Per Year):

<u>Level</u>	<u>1987-92</u>	<u>1992-97</u>
1	3.445	3.720
2	3.225	3.225
3	3.145	3.200
4	3.070	3.075

(Level #3 is the same as the current level.)

Level #1 implies a real increase of 3% per year. Especially our brigades can be furnished with modern equipment and Sweden can start to develop a new tank. New anti-aircraft missiles and helicopters will be procured. The number of submarines will increase to 14 and one additional aircraft squadron will be organized. The training will be improved.

Level #2 implies that some improvements can be carried out concerning training, antitank weapons, light tanks, defence against submarines, and defence against NBC weapons. On this level it is not possible to improve the defence in such a manner that it will correspond to the threat.

Level #3 implies that the Army can only give priority to antitank and anti-aircraft capacity of the brigades. It is not possible to both procure light tanks and start to develop a new tank. The naval forces can only give priority to develop patrol boats, submarines, coast artillery units with missiles, and amphibious units. A new aircraft ("GRIPEN") will be procured, but other functions of the Air Force can not be improved in a proper way.

Level #4 implies that especially the quality and even the quantity of our wartime organization will decrease. We cannot retain our armored brigades after the year 2000, and then our ability to attack in open

terrain will end. The capacity to defend our territory against submarine violations will decrease. Three aircraft squadrons will expire. The refresher training must be reduced. Level #4 cannot support the Swedish security policy in a proper way.

In summary, only Levels #1 and #2 can be considered as realistic alternatives in developing the Swedish defence in the future. If the Parliament decides on the lowest level, there is a risk that the Warsaw Pact and NATO will consider the Swedish defence too weak to defend its own country. Then our defence is no longer a strong instrument for our security policy.

Summary.

Sweden has lived in peace for more than 170 years. We have been saved from being dragged into two world wars. Of course, it was not our security policy--our neutrality--alone that saved us, but also strategic and political circumstances beyond our control. But no one can deny that our policy of neutrality was one of the requisites for keeping Sweden out of World Wars I and II. With this historical experience, there is no apparent reason to change the Swedish security policy in the future. Almost all Swedes support our current foreign policy. The risk is if Sweden would decrease its defence to the degree that it could no longer support security policy. Then we may have a discussion about whether it is better to join a military alliance or not. Therefore, the defence decision in 1987 is very important. My judgment is that our Parliament is ready to increase the defence budget by about one to two percent. It will not give us a sufficiently strong defence, but it will tell other countries that we are ready to improve our defence. If this assumption proves correct, I cannot see any change in our policy of neutrality in the future.

ENDNOTES

1. 1984 Defence Committee, Sweden's Security Policy: Entering the 90's, Swedish Official Reports Series 1985:23, Ministry of Defence, p. 7.
2. Sverker Astrom, Sweden's Policy of Neutrality, 1983, p. 5.
3. Astrom, pp. 13-14.
4. Soviet Research Centre, Sandhurst, Soviet Amphibious Warfare and War on the Northern Flank, pp. 14-15.
5. 1984 Defence Committee, pp. 7-8.
6. Astrom, p. 6.
7. Astrom, p. 9.
8. Astrom, p. 14.
9. Astrom, p. 16.
10. Hugh O'Donell, Jr., Northern Flank Maritime Offensive, September 1985, pp. 45-46.
11. O'Donell, Jr., pp. 46-47.
12. O'Donell, Jr., p. 49.
13. 1984 Defence Committee, pp. 50-51.
14. 1984 Defence Committee, pp. 56-57.
15. Astrom, pp. 19-20.
16. 1984 Defence Committee, pp. 77-80.
17. Supreme Commander, Sweden, OB 85, Supplement p. 13.
18. Supreme Commander, Sweden, Supplement pp. 34-36.
19. Supreme Commander, Sweden, pp. 22-23.

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